School of Policy and International Affairs

 

 

 

2008 Monterey Proliferation Seminar
June 10-12, 2008
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, USA

Sponsored by the Advanced Systems Concepts Office,
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

In cooperation with King’s College, University of London; Gulf Research Center, Dubai; Fondation pour la recherche Stratégique, Paris; University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria; School of Policy and International Affairs, University of Maine

Global Perspectives of the Proliferation Landscape:
An Assessment of Tools and Policy Problems

The last decade has seen the international community develop a complex mix of additional new programs and protocols to help control the spread of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons.  In addition to strengthening existing regimes like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, states have undertaken a series of ambitious efforts under the auspices of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which obligates all member states to take concrete steps to prevent the transfer of WMD-related materials to terrorists.  International efforts have been complemented by an aggressive series of regional and national initiatives mounted by the European Union and the United States to add additional tools aimed at stopping the spread of these dangerous technologies and capabilities.

Over the decade, events provided a mixed bag.  Libya unexpectedly abandoned its nuclear program in 2003. In 2004, Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan revealed his involvement in an elaborate program to supply various states with nuclear technologies. Khan, later placed under house arrest, revealed the existence of an elaborate procurement and supplier network using companies located in South Africa, Indonesia and Europe to service his nuclear customers.  North Korea allegedly tested a nuclear device November 2006, but then reached agreement in 2007 to dismantle its program under certain conditions.  Iran’s apparent pursuit of nuclear enrichment capabilities outside those allowed under the NPT remained an ongoing concern over the decade.  In late 2007, the United States released a National Intelligence Estimate revealing that Iran was judged to have given up its clandestine nuclear program in 2003, but also alarmingly revealed that Iran is keeping its options open to develop nuclear weapons in the future.  In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq in a war primarily justified on the basis of proliferation concerns, only to later find that Saddam had already destroyed his WMD. In September 2007, Israel struck what it claimed to be an unfinished nuclear reactor under construction in Syria being built with North Koran assistance.  Syria denied the accusations.

Global developments in the area of nuclear power generation also provided cause for concern, with the prospect of ambitious plans around the world to expand peaceful nuclear programs that establish an infrastructure that could allow states to achieve a “latent” nuclear status. In July 2005, the United States and India announced a deal to cooperate more closely on nuclear power generation despite India’s remaining outside the NPT framework   In the Persian Gulf, the Gulf Cooperation Council states announced ambitious plans in December 2006 to develop an elaborate infrastructure of nuclear power plants to satisfy their energy needs.  Other Middle Eastern states such as Egypt, Algeria and Morocco have also announced ambitious plans to proceed with development of nuclear power. 

To address these and other developments, the United States and the international community have developed what is commonly described as a “defense in depth” to supplement existing treaties and export control regimes aimed at slowing the proliferation and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.  The layered defense consists of a complex array of treaties, export control protocols, regional initiatives, individual state initiatives, and ad hoc state arrangements.  Some of these are referenced below.

1. Multilateral Treaties and Instruments
1. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
2. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
3. Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC)
4. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which imposes binding obligations on all member states to take a series of concrete steps to prevent WMD from falling into the hands of non-state terrorist groups.
2. Multilateral Export Control Regimes
1. Nuclear Supplier Group
2. Zangger Committee
3. Missile Technology Control Regime
4. Australia Group
3. Programs and Initiatives to eliminate WMD-related facilities and materials.
1. G8 Global Partnership against WMD
2. Global Threat Reduction Initiative
3. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
4. Regional Initiatives
1. EU Export Control Cooperation Initiative
2. EU Joint Action Plan to enhance compliance with BWC
3. EU TACIS Program
4. WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East
5. Efforts to strengthen existing regimes
1. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
6. Ad-Hoc Arrangements
1. Proliferation Security Initiative

Conference Themes and Questions

The 2008 Monterey Proliferation Seminar seeks to combine regional and
functional expertise to assess the effectiveness of this architecture, or defense in depth, in combating proliferation.  This year’s event will feature the support of a variety of international partnering organizations to help bring a unique and varied perspective to this issue.  Proliferation is a global phenomenon that requires global solutions executed by states and between states.  The partnering organizations supporting this year’s event: King’s College at the University of London, La Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and the Gulf Research Center in Dubai all bring their cutting edge experts and expertise to inform the seminar’s treatment of the following issues and themes for the seminar:

1. Is the layered approach working?
1. Are global and regional trends in proliferation headed in the right direction as result of the layered approach?
2. Are potential state proliferators being deterred or dissuaded from pursuing nuclear and/or chemical and biological capabilities?
3. Are non-state actors being similarly deterred or dissuaded from pursuit of nuclear and/or chemical and biological capabilities?
4. How has the layered approach affected the incentive structure of potential suppliers and customers of nuclear, chemical and biological materials?
2. Do regional states believe that the expanded architecture is relevant to the proliferation environments in their particular regions?
3. Has the architecture adequately addressed the threat from non-state actors?
1. The demand side from terrorist groups.
2. The supply side of non-state procurement networks.
4. What are the limitations of states as they seek to plug the identified holes in the non-proliferation architecture?
1. Political will
2. Licensing
3. Border controls
5. How does the international community construct export control regimes that strike the right balance between effective controls and the pressures of globalization that are forcing companies to integrate and collaborate?
6. What additional “layers” are available to states as they seek to control proliferation to state- and non-state actors?
7. Is there still a role for deterrence in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation strategies?
8. What are the challenges facing the intelligence community in supporting the multi-layered defense-in-depth?

 

Principal Investigator
James Russell, CCC, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA; 831-656-2109; jarussel@nps.edu; sipernet russelja@nps.navy.smil.mil; JWICS: gdrusja@nps.pacom.ic.gov

Administrative POC
Trisha Bury, CCC, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA; 831-656-7527; tlbury@nps.edu

Registration

The pre-registration form must be filled out and submitted to Trisha Bury via fax (831-656-2949) or email (tlbury@nps.edu) no later than Friday 9 May 2008. Please note that there is no conference fee this year, but there will be fees for the optional wine tasting and for any additional guests that wish to come to the beach party (details below), payable by cash during the on-site conference registration.

Hotel Reservations

A block of rooms will be held for 9 – 13 June at the Hilton Garden Inn Monterey, a short walk from the Naval Postgraduate School. You are responsible for reserving your own room by calling the Hilton at 831-373-6141 by 9 May 2008. When making reservations, you must mention that you are part of the Monterey Proliferation Seminar group in order to secure the per diem rate, which is $125 per night. Any active US Military Attendee with ID and Travel Orders or US Government employee paying with US Government check or credit card will be tax exempt. Attendees must present Travel Orders or Traveler Authorization letter to be eligible for the Federal Per Diem rate. http://www.hiltongardeninn.com/en/gi/hotels/index.jhtml?ctyhocn=MRYMHGI

 

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